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ABSTRACT
In this article, the author explores the interest of the interwar 
intellectuals in “time, death, God”. This focus on temporality as an 
existential problem engendered some major philosophical projects, 
which aimed at complete revision of how philosophy should be 
done, including Henri Bergson, Edmund Husserl, Franz Rosenzweig. 
The main part outlines a philosophical project of Yakov Druskin 
who addressed the problem of temporality in a highly original 
manner. Druskin combined philosophical reflection on time in its 
existential meaning with the search for intellectual methods and 
linguistic techniques to transcend our ordinary reality. Among these 
methods, in Druskin’s works at least two major modes—meditation 
and “hieroglyphs”—can be identified. Both methods, however, aim 
at “transforming rather than informing” and at enabling us to linger in 
a “certain equilibrium with a minor error”.
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Introduction
A century ago, Franz Rosenzweig published his Der Stern der Erlösung [The Star of 
Redemption] (1921), in which a prominent German Jewish intellectual sought to address 
“various themes already familiar to a new generation tutored in Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, 
Dilthey, and Bergson” (Gordon, 2007, p. 122). Peter Eli Gordon enumerates among 
these themes further
the primacy of poetic language, the bankruptcy of rationalist and idealist 
philosophy, the constitutive-existential function of temporality, the linguistic, 
spoken, and always intersubjective grounding of human meaning, the 
paradigmatic import of religious revelation, and, perhaps most of all, the turn 
from theoretical knowledge to ‘life’ itself as the chief field of hermeneutic 
inquiry (Ibid.). 
These themes Rosenzweig developed in his “new thinking” laid out in The Star and, 
perhaps, they can be best summarised in a phrase, which Aleksander Vvedensky 
used: “I am interested in three themes—time, death, God” (see: Druskin, 1998a, p. 47, 
my translation from Russian—A. M.). This phrase was reported to us by Yakov Druskin, 
a Russian philosopher, who, in another work Zvezda Bessmyslitsy [The Star of 
Meaninglessness] (Druskin, 1998c), explicated Vvedensky’s philosophical approach 
and literary method.
The interest of the interwar intellectuals in “time, death, God” was spurred by the 
profound suspicion towards or outward rejection of established systematic philosophy 
in its idealist or materialist versions. Systems of philosophy seemed too abstract and 
the laws of history, which had promised the progress of humanity, seemed too arid 
to validate the subjective existence of individual human beings who had to navigate 
through major transformations of the early twentieth century. A number of intellectuals 
focused on temporality, primarily in its existential and subjective function rather than 
on history in its majestic course because in the systems of philosophy, ironically, the 
explanation of the ongoing social transformations by the laws of history deprived the 
future of its novelty. As Leonard Lawlor notes, “continental philosophers are opposed 
to norms because norms stop thinking. Norms allow us to deduce actions, and then 
we do not really struggle with the decision. Norms stop thinking because they close off 
the new” (Lawlor, 2012, p. 50).
On the European continent, this focus on temporality as an existential problem 
engendered some major philosophical projects, which aimed at complete revision 
of how philosophy should be done, including Henri Bergson, Edmund Husserl, 
Franz Rosenzweig, to name just a few. However, in order to explore this personal 
significance of time, to initiate new ways of thinking about time, it was necessary to 
find new ways of speaking about time. Thus, the philosophical reflection on time was 
interwoven with the search by philosophers, poets, artists, musicians for the new 
forms of conveying and expressing the experience of time. Moreover, as Lawlor aptly 
puts it, for these philosophers “the idea that thinking happens to you implies that 
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thinking is not a natural ability. It occurs under the pressure of extreme experiences 
and experimentation. Because thinking happens in an experience, continental 
philosophy is always interested in the experience of death, madness, and 
blindness. All of these experiences concern disorientation in time” (Lawlor, 2012, 
p. 47). Thus, apart from new ways of thinking and of speaking about time, it is 
necessary to find ways, methods, techniques of “disorienting” us, of pushing us out 
of the ordinary and the everyday in order to create the conditions for experiencing 
time existentially.
In the Bergsonian approach, access to pure time is gained by means of 
intuition. However, the way Bergson describes how intuition can actually work 
is mostly in negative terms and, as it were, in parables. In his lectures Histoire de 
l’idée de temps [History of the Idea of Time] (Bergson, 2016), Bergson strives to 
direct us to the comprehension of time by a number of oppositions: internal–external, 
direct–intermediate, simple–complex/composed, relative–absolute. Bergson outlines 
the distinction between internal (direct, simple, absolute, intuitive) and external 
(mediated, composed, relative, conceptual) knowledge of things by deconstructing 
our ordinary experiences of learning a foreign language, observing some movement, 
understanding a fictional character in a novel, grasping the notion of life in 
biology (Bergson, 2016). He gives an ordinary example and shows how it actually 
misconstrues the experience of duration, although it is this duration that makes 
it at all possible. In all these cases, Bergson proceeds in, what can be called, an 
apophatic fashion: we need to step out of our habitual ways of perception, use of 
concepts, reliance on analytical thinking, usage of language, and to replace it all 
with intuition, or direct knowledge of the absolute.
In phenomenological philosophy, this process of transcending the ordinary 
and the everyday is described by the concept of epoche, or phenomenological 
reduction. But, in a way, this procedure of lifting us out of the ordinary is similar 
to what various thinkers described as ecstasis or rapture and is fraught with 
religious overtones. Georgiy Chernavin highlights the following observation made 
by Druskin who berates Husserl for insufficient courage to accept the religious 
function of the epoche:
Ambiguity of transcendental reduction, its madness is the same madness 
as the madness of religious conversion. Husserl himself says that many 
phenomenologists pass off their purely psychological descriptions for 
a phenomenological investigation. But if we deny the religious foundation of 
transcendental reduction, any phenomenological reduction will be merely 
a psychological description. Phenomenological reduction presupposes two 
states, or two orders, of mind. But there is only a natural state or an unnatural 
state, that is, a religious state, no third state of mind exists (...) Husserl himself 
wished to come to God. But this is impossible, it is contradictory: it is I who 
runs away from God. If God does not drag me to Himself, I can’t come to God 
(…) transcendental reduction is necessary. Husserl is wrong in believing that 
it [transcendental reduction] is only theoretical, it is simultaneously practical. 
Changing Societies & Personalities, 2021, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 252–266 255
Therefore, I can’t do it [reduction] myself, although I ought to do it. (Druskin’s 
passage Videnie nevideniya [The Vision of the Unseen], cited from Chernavin, 
2020, p. 75, my translation from Russian—A. M.).
Transcendental reduction, therefore, can be regarded as a religious act, an 
act of meditation aimed at ecstasis. But this act introduces rupture into the way we 
experience the world and splits it into two—or potentially many—worlds.
Rosenzweig interprets this division of the totality of knowledge, so vigorously 
sought for by systematic philosophy, in the context of religion. He claims that 
it is the unity of reasoning, which here insists on its right over against the 
multiplicity of knowledge by asserting the totality of the world. The unity of the 
logos establishes the unity of the world-as-totality (...) Thus a successful 
resistance against the totality of the world implies at the same time a denial of 
the unity of reasoning (Rosenzweig, 1921/1971, p. 12).
But for Rosenzweig, this exit from false totality, which systematic philosophy 
tried to impose by its notion of “all”, or the “world”, can only be achieved in 
emancipating individuality through an otherworldly experience given to us in religion 
and, in particular, in revelation. As P. E. Gordon explains, “through the encounter with 
divine love, we pass from abjection to reconciliation (…) Because they [Jews] remain 
open to the eternity of future redemption, they exhibit a profound indifference to 
history” (Gordon, 2007, p. 135). Thus, truly experiencing time presupposes actually 
stepping out of history. In other words, one has to establish a connection between 
one’s immediate moment and eternity.
Both Bergson and Husserl showcase duration, the internal continuous 
process of experiencing time, the process, in fact, of living as a conscious being. 
Both philosophers try to lead us to this experience of time by affecting a rupture 
with the experience of the ordinary by means of intuition or reduction, that 
is, by reconceptualising traditional methods of philosophy. Both philosophers 
try to reinvent how philosophy should be done, while Franz Rosenzweig aims 
at “new thinking”, which ought to be based on the old revelation. It is divine 
revelation alone, which can open our true selves and our actual place in the world 
to our reflection.
In what follows I intend to offer a brief outline of another philosophical project, 
which addressed the problem of temporality in a highly original manner. It combined 
philosophical reflection on time and eternity in their existential, subjective meaning 
with the search for intellectual methods and linguistic techniques to transcend 
our ordinary and everyday attitude to reality. This project was developed over 
the decades by Yakov Druskin who traditionally is mentioned in relation with the 
Russian Avant-garde stars—Aleksander Vvedensky and Daniil Kharms whose 
archive Druskin saved from the besieged and bombarded Leningrad, and whose 
philosophical discussions he reported and whose literary oeuvre he explicated in 
his own texts.
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“Before Belongings to Anything”: Yakov Druskin in His Circumstances
Yakov Druskin was born in 1902 in Yekaterinoslav, he was the first son to the Druskins, 
a Jewish family whose name probably stems from Lithuanian “salt”, and who were 
involved in revolutionary activities, including participation in “Bund” (“General Jewish 
Labour Bund in Lithuania, Poland and Russia”). The family were also blessed with 
two more children—Mikhail, a famous Soviet musicologist, and Lidiya who preserved, 
helped publish and commented on Yakov Druskin’s archives. Yakov attended 
Lentovskaia Gymnasium where he made acquaintance with Leonid Lipavsky and 
Aleksander Vvedensky, but their true intellectual friendship developed later. He 
graduated from the philosophy department of the Petrograd State University and 
Leningrad Conservatory (the latter while working as a teacher at school).
In the late 1920s, Druskin takes part in the Chinari group whose name refers to 
the Slavonic equivalent of “order” or “rank” and, omitting the disputes about precise 
titulature, more known due to the activities of another grouping OBERIU (“Association 
of Real Art”). Vvedensky and Kharms perished in the early 1940s, Druskin saved their 
archives and was evacuated to Sverdlovsk, but in 1944, he returned to Leningrad 
where he lived to the end of his days in 1980 (see Dmitrenko & Sazhin, 1998, for 
more details). Druskin was fascinated by music and published a volume on Bach 
and cooperated in translating Bach studies, though later he was no less thrilled by 
Webern and Schoenberg (M. Druskin, 1999). He also developed interest in painting 
due to his friendship with V. Sterligov. But overall, to the external view, his life was 
utterly uneventful.
Druskin himself reports two events that deeply affected his personality in 
his diaries, which Druskin named Pered prinadlezhnostiami chego-libo [Before 
Belongings to Anything] (Druskin, 1999). The first event was what he describes as 
a call of God and a realisation of the fact of human mortality in 1911. In 1928, some 
episode of revelatory experience was recorded by Druskin in a small piece under the 
title Dushevniy prazdnik [Spiritual Festivity]:
I have seen something simple, something so simple, clear, and evident that 
I can’t even understand how I could not see it before, how I could live without 
seeing it. This was simple, clear, and evident all the time, right before me, it was 
my soul.
(...) This is so simple: think of your soul. Again, “think of your soul”, but it is your 
soul, that is, when I think of my soul, I have my soul. Thinking about the soul is 
thought. But the soul is not thought, neither thinking nor reflecting. Soul is greater 
than thought, than thinking, because it is soul that thinks and has thought. Still, 
when I think of my soul I have my soul, this thought, this thinking about my soul 
actually is my soul. So, this thought is greater than this thought, it exceeds the 
limits of thought: as it is [this thought about the soul] is greater than it is.
I have seen something new, something simple, something joyous, I always had it 
but I have not seen it. No, I have always seen it, could not not see it and still did not 
see it, only now I see it (Sazhin, 1998, p. 655, my translation from Russian—A. M.).
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While highly important, it was not transformative unlike the second event, which 
occurred in 1932. It was a dream, in which his former teacher from Lentovskaia 
Gymnasium, L. Georg appeared to him and “showed me death (...) but this was the death 
in relation with the fear of God: ‘I am not ready for the Judgement, and death scares 
me’” (Druskina, 1999a, p. 529, my translation from Russian—A.M.). This prompted the 
decision to abandon philosophical system building in a traditional way and align thinking 
and living in his personal development. His subsequent life was the exercise in finding 
ways to extricate oneself from the world, to transcend the ordinary and the everyday:
I never felt myself at home in this life (...) Earlier I thought this was caused by 
personal circumstances, my school work, for instance, or the like. Every spring 
I thought: something is going to happen; I will leave the school by the fall and 
start a new life. Then I realised that nothing is going to happen, and even if it 
would have happened, I still will not feel at home in life (…) When Georg came to 
me and showed me death, I thought: I was insincere, I wanted to build a system, 
but a system is impossible, every system has gaps and contradictions, I bridged 
the gaps as I could and I ignored the contradictions. Before the face of death, 
we can’t write like that. I have rejected the system (Druskina, 1999a, p. 529, my 
translation from Russian—A. M.).
Since this personal revelation, Druskin has decided to embark on the project 
of turning thinking into practice. He made himself and his thinking an object of 
experiment and investigation. He experimented both in his writing and in his 
thinking. His writing is extremely esoteric and, as it were, idiosyncratic.
Problems of Interpretation
Several scholars attempted to approach his philosophy and find it an appropriate context. 
Aleksey Kozyrev (Kozyrev, 1997) reviews Druskin’s later work Videnie nevideniya 
[The Vision of the Unseen] and compares Druskin’s quest for sanctity to Gregory 
Skovoroda’s, while his philosophical methodology is described as phenomenological 
reduction and one of the ways Husserl’s phenomenology was adopted in Russia. 
Georgiy Chernavin (Chernavin, 2020), on the other hand, suspects that Druskin was 
playing at phenomenological reduction, whereas, in fact, he parodied the literary genre 
of philosophical text, quite in line with his OBERIU friends, in order to create a poetic 
effect. Chernavin wonders whether it would not be more accurate to assume that 
Druskin actually aimed at producing “an applied psychedelic use of phenomenological 
methodology” (Chernavin 2020, p. 80, my translation from Russian—A. M.).
To some extent, this conjecture echoes the analysis of Evgeny Pavlov who 
sees Druskin in the context of literary experiments of other OBERIU members (see 
Roberts, 1997): 
 Thus surviving Russian avant-gardists built literary machines of their own with 
which to critique and radically transform the commonly accepted notions of 
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time and history. Kharms’ and Vvedensky’s machines were of the extreme 
variety, each in his own way questioning the very core of what constitutes our 
temporal perception and any philosophical and social systems we construct on 
its foundation (Pavlov, 2012, p. 298).
It is hard to agree, though, that the interest in time, and, we should remember, 
in death and God, of the OBERIU can be explained away as a competition with 
and a response to Stalinism. Particularly it is difficult to see the direct link between 
Stalin’s “time machine” and OBERIU’s “literary machines” when Pavlov claims:
Yet the obsessive thinking about time that marks the entire oeuvre of both 
men is not a mere exercise in abstract speculation, but inevitably represents 
an engagement with the political in ways that are no less radical than an open 
confrontation with the regime (...) A certain time machine is at work during the 
years of high Stalinism: it aims to conquer time by “petrifying the utopia” of the 
future and remaking history, as it ought to have happened (Pavlov, 2012, p. 296).
Graham Roberts discusses philosophy of OBERIU (1997) in greater detail. 
While indicating the common aspiration of the Chinari group “to construct a new, 
non-substantial existential ontology”, quoting from Druskin’s remark (Ibid., p. 126), 
Roberts seems to overstate the common theoretical foundation and principles of 
their philosophies, as if it were a unified whole, and seems to ignore the substantial 
differences in philosophical orientations, methods, and achievements. Druskin 
describes his own interest, his own twist of the group’s project in his essay Chinari:
Thinking, by its own nature, contrasts what is thought with thinking itself, that is, 
it extracts from thinking, from the act of thinking its content and its object; and it 
opposes thinking to the content of thinking and then [it opposes] thought to the 
object of thought, which is independent from thinking. Unlike animals, human 
beings think and thereby oppose themselves to society (...) I am interested in this 
last division. This is what I mean: I am left alone. I must correct myself: by saying I, 
I mean everyone, not just myself. Everyone who thinks will say: I am alone, I am 
before God, I and God. Again, I must correct myself: I meant exactly myself and 
not everyone, I don’t even know what everyone is, I don’t even know if there is 
any other. When I think, I do not see him. Not some other, but exactly myself, 
and right now: I am alone. Not because I do not have any acquaintances. I am 
alone because there is no external comprehension: I comprehend nothing. This, 
however, does not imply that there is no internal comprehension, that nobody can 
understand anyone else. But to have actual internal comprehension—rather than 
hypocrisy—a complete incomprehension must precede it; I must remain alone: 
I and God. But once I said this, I see that not I, but God: there is no I anymore. 
But how can I say that there is no I? I repeat: there is no I. The first part of the 
sentence negates the second, but both are correct. This is what I call the last 
division: I am divided, I observe my own absence and do not comprehend it. But 
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only through this incomprehension can one come to the internal comprehension, 
some incomprehension is comprehension, the rest is hypocrisy. Most of all 
I dread internal hypocrisy, the lie to myself. Only by dividing the incomprehension 
of others from myself and myself from the world will I be able to avoid internal lie. 
But this incomprehension is comprehension. Then, I can see life. Not the grid of 
relations and categories which reason imposes on life, but [I can see] actual life; 
[I can see] death and God, [I can see] mystery (Druskin, 1998a, pp. 63–64, my 
translation from Russian—A. M.).
Distinctly theological agenda of Druskin and his specific methodology, of which 
later, sets him clearly apart from other members of the Chinari and the OBERIU 
groupings.
While Druskin’s name is rarely absent in the discussions about OBERIU 
(Ostashevsky, 2012), there are few scholars who analysed Druskin’s philosophy in 
his own right. Tat’iana Rezvykh in explicating the antinomies of time in Vvedensky’s 
writings (Rezvykh, 2014) addresses some aspects of Druskin’s philosophical 
reflections, but some major effort at research is needed to give due to this remarkable 
and profound philosopher.
Translation Issues and Beyond
It should be noted that there is only one available translation of his texts published 
in English: some excerpts from the diaries (Death and The End of the World) and 
his Letter to Kharms (see: Ostashevsky, 2006). This lack of translations and the 
preference to abundantly quote rather than to analyse Druskin’s writings can be 
explained, on the one hand, by the complexity of the task of translation. Because 
Druskin, firstly, uses a number of categories, which despite their apparent simplicity 
are hard to translate.
Two examples can be given here. His fundamental notion of pogreshnost’, 
particularly in the formula ravnovesie s nebol’shoi pogreshnost’yu, has both 
mathematical and religious connotations. Thus, E. Ostashevsky chooses to translate 
this formula as “a certain equilibrium with a slight peccadillo” (Ostashevsky, 2006, 
p. 220): “Its meaning is deliberately vague, but the peccadillo is, as it were, departure 
from dead symmetry by either aleatory or voluntary error that constitutes creation 
in both the cosmological and the artistic senses of the word” (Ostashevsky, 2006, 
p. 252). On the other hand, G. Roberts uses “minor error” for pogreshnost’ (Roberts 
1997, p. 26). A wider range of connotations, in my view, can be evoked by using 
“minor error”, the latter alluding to the “measurement error” and “margin of error” in 
mathematics as well as to moral sin and to cognitive lapse, but these remain crude 
approximations to the original.
Another example is his fundamental categories of “this” and “that”. Despite his 
philosophical education at the best Russian university at the time and his extensive 
philosophical erudition, Druskin shuns from using traditional philosophical categories 
in his writings. One of the most remarkable things that a reader may notice in perusing 
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his texts is that there are practically no Grecisms, Latinisms or other philosophical 
terms of foreign origin. Druskin’s vocabulary is astonishingly Russian in the choice 
of philosophical terminology. Yet, Druskin does not create any artificially Russian 
philosophical vocabulary; on the contrary, he relies primarily on the use of ordinary 
language such as, for instance, demonstrative pronouns this and that. Druskin, though, 
endows these simple pronouns with conceptual significance. But that makes them 
very difficult to translate because so much hinges on the underlying ordinary usage.
Secondly, the lack of translations and the preference to extensively quote him 
can be explained, by the methods Druskin uses in his philosophical work. Most of his 
texts are not purported to inform the reader, they intend to transform, to reproduce in a 
reader the transformation that was exercised and perfected by the writer. The editors 
often deplore the fact that Druskin did not date his texts and often returned to them and 
reworked them. The texts were, indeed, diligently honed instruments of meditation.
Commentators sometimes referred to the similarities of Druskin’s methodology 
and docta ignorantia developed by Nicholas of Cusa and dating back to Dionysius the 
Areopagite’s corpus (Rezvykh, 2014, p. 91). But it is important to keep in mind that this 
similarity does not lie in conceptual continuation. Nicholas of Cusa was a philosopher 
who tried to develop philosophical concepts, often drawing on mathematical notions 
and analogies, in building his late Renaissance theology. Unlike Nicholas, Dionysius, 
whoever might be hidden by this name, was a practicing mystic and in his Mystical 
Theology, the author was not trying to expound a theological doctrine per se, to argue 
and to convince a reader. He aimed at transforming the reader’s mind, at inducing 
through meditation the experience of the divine. But how can one express the 
ineffable divinity, which is beyond all and every being? Dionysius relies on oxymoronic 
and paradoxical constructions such as “the rays of the divine darkness” (Pseudo-
Dionysius, 1999, p. 212). These constructions are meaningless conceptually. But 
the semantic clash caused by “the most illustrious darkness”, “eyeless minds” and 
“ignorant knowledge” (or “learned ignorance”) in this mystical treatise is instrumental 
in achieving its practical purpose—to meditate out of the creation and into the state of 
ecstasis, that is, to achieve the union with the divine.
In his reflection on the aspirations and methods of Chinari group, Druskin 
distinguishes two types of the meaninglessness (Druskin, 1998a, pp. 47 ff.). 
Situational meaninglessness refers to the breaking of conventions and expectations, 
of norms of behavior, and of rules of acting and being in the familiar reality. For instance, 
Andersen’s tale (Keiserens nye Klæder [The Emperor’s New Clothes]) about the 
child who called off the bluff of the naked monarch. Semantic meaninglessness 
entails the clash of meanings in an utterance, in a sentence or a phrase. To illustrate 
the consequences of such a semantic clash, Druskin cites Vvedensky:
If we experience wild incomprehension, we will acknowledge that none can 
dispel this incomprehension with anything clear. Woe to us who think of time. 
But then as this incomprehension grows, you and I realize that there is no woe, 
neither to us, nor to those who think, nor to time (Druskin, 1998a, p. 47, my 
translation from Russian—A. M.).
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Semantic meaninglessness, thus, becomes a method of gaining access beyond 
the ordinary and the everyday, access to the other worlds.
Chinari used the notion of “neighboring worlds” to describe these alternative 
orders of reality, in which one or more of the familiar qualities might be reversed. For 
instance, “we live in the world of firm objects, we are surrounded by air, which we 
perceive as emptiness. How would a semiliquid jellyfish who dwells in the liquid 
water feel?” (Druskin, 1998a, pp. 60–61, my translation from Russian—A. M.).
Finally, could the inhabitants of those neighboring worlds communicate with us, 
and, if they could, what would be their message? Chinari used the word “vestniki”—
messengers, literally angels, to describe the inhabitants of the neighboring worlds. 
One of the most significant philosophical reflections written by Yakov Druskin are 
included in the groups of texts under the title Razgovory Vestnikov [Conversations of 
Messengers] (Druskin, 1998b). The translation of a fragment from Tret’e issledovanie 
ob etom i tom [The Third Investigation about This and That], part VI, in Razgovory 
Vestnikov [Conversations of Messengers] is attached in the Appendix. But in this 
translation, I hope, it can be observed that unlike his partners in Chinari group 
Druskin deploys neither situational nor semantic meaninglessness. Yet, I would 
concur with the hypothesis made by G. Chernavin, though in a rather ironic manner, 
that Druskin’s texts aim primarily at transforming rather than informing.
What Can Take Us Beyond?
When Druskin was disappointed in his idea of building a new system, he continued 
his literary and philosophical experimentations. But now they were all directed at 
practical aims. His writing and thinking were ascetic exercises that were needed to 
transform his life, or rather, in his own words, to find his true home. Instead of abstract 
reasoning and theoretical conceptualizations traditional for the European philosophy, 
in Druskin’s works we can detect at least two major modes of “transforming rather 
than informing”: meditation and hieroglyphs.
Reportedly, the notion of hieroglyphs was suggested by Lipavsky, but Druskin 
adopted it, perfected it, and reflected on it in several texts. In Zvezda Bessmyslitsy 
[The Star of Meaninglessness], Druskin elaborates on this notion in some detail:
Hieroglyph is a material phenomenon, which I can directly perceive, feel, 
apprehend and which tells me more than it can directly express as a material 
phenomenon. Hieroglyph is ambivalent, it has its proper and additional meaning. 
The proper meaning of hieroglyph is its definition in its capacity of a material 
phenomenon—physical, biological, physiological, psychophysiological. Its 
additional meaning can’t be defined precisely and unambiguously, it can be 
conveyed metaphorically, poetically, sometimes by joining logically incongruous 
notions, that is, by antinomy, contradiction, meaninglessness. Hieroglyph can be 
understood as an indirect or mediated speech of the immaterial, that is, of spiritual 
or supersensible, by means of material and sensible when it is addressed to me” 
(Druskin, 1998b, pp. 550–551, my translation from Russian—A. M.).
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One might wonder to what extent this interpretation of the hieroglyph is similar 
to the notion of symbol in the Areopagite’s corpus whose function is described as 
“to reveal and to conceal at the same time”. But it is important to emphasize that 
hieroglyphs are much more diverse and poetic than theological symbols. Examples 
of hieroglyphs include fall of the leaves, fire in a fireplace, and a series of literary and 
cinematographic images such as the road in the final episode of Chaplin’s The Pilgrim. 
Moreover, while theological symbols all point in the same direction—towards God, 
hieroglyphs reveal the multiplicity of neighboring worlds.
The other methodology, which I named meditation earlier, might seem a parody 
of philosophical treatise, as Chernavin suggested. Some of Razgovory Vestnikov 
[Conversations of Messengers], indeed, might seem repetitive, obscure, and 
uninformative. But I argue that this is precisely their point. They are not purported to 
report anything to us, to enlighten us or to educate us in any way. They work as music 
works by setting certain rhythm, and certain pitch, and certain mood, and by guiding 
our thinking in a very specific way. The ultimate purpose of these meditations is not to 
fall into any of the neighboring worlds, but to remain on the border between them, in 
the gap between different orders, different systems of logic and aloof from the norms, 
which subjugate into compliance our thinking, our living, our existing. Druskin strives 
to enable us not to succumb to any definite order and to linger in a moment, to hang at 
the tip of the balance in a “certain equilibrium with a minor error”.
In conclusion, I would emphasize again the originality and the ingenuity of the 
philosophical project developed by Yakov Druskin. L. Lawlor claims that
the experience of the moment being the experience of death implies that 
although all continental philosophy starts out being a relativism and a 
subjectivism, all continental philosophy ends up being an “absolutism” and an 
“objectivism.” Death is what is outside of subjective experience; therefore, being 
non-subjective, death is “objective.” Death is what I cannot relate to, since 
relating to it destroys my life; therefore, being non-relative, death is absolute 
(Lawlor, 2012, p. 32),
but I would caution against such a generalization. Druskin’s philosophical practice of 
reflecting on “time, death, God” demonstrates that death is not “outside of subjective 
experience”, its deeply personal acknowledgment initiates the search for an exit 
from the temporal world and for the means—philosophical and poetic—to enter the 
moment, in which God meets its “thinking creature”.
Many intellectuals of the interwar period sought to make meaning of the historical 
transformations, which undermined the Enlightenment’s expectations of progress. 
The latter was supposed to combine social, technical, and moral development of 
the humanity. But while technology and societies were becoming more and more 
complex, they were also growing more and more overbearing towards individual 
subjectivity. In this article, I outlined a number of ways that philosophers proposed to 
reconnect human existence with transcendent dimensions of reality and to renew the 
relation between philosophy and religion. While H. Bergson leaned towards traditional 
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Catholic Christianity, F. Rosenzweig offered a renewal of Judaism, Yakov Druskin 
practiced his own sort of religion, though based on the Gospels.
In my view, the study of the religious aspects of the Russian avant-garde will 
greatly enrich our understanding of the “continental philosophy” and will place Yakov 
Druskin on par with most prominent intellectuals of the interwar period Bergson, 
Husserl and Rosenzweig.
Appendix
Razgovory Vestnikov [Conversations of Messengers]
Tret’e issledovanie ob etom i tom [The Third Investigation about This and That]
VI
1. Watching trees in a garden during the rain, or watching fire in a fireplace, or 
the flow of a river you find some certainty and clarity. You say: I have achieved 
an equilibrium, I have seen the great moment, when there was no time, [I have 
seen that] something truly exists. But then you notice a minor error, and the 
equilibrium is disturbed.
2. When the great moment exists, something can be named. There will be an 
affirmation, but there is yet no reasoning. This is the way of messengers and 
trees to give names. If, however, you have noticed a minor error, the names are 
doubtful.
3. Once I noticed a small error in some equilibrium, I began my investigation. 
I said something and said this. I noticed some duplication here: I supposed 
that something existed, but by naming it this, I gave it existence anew. And it 
exists as if for the first time: I have realised that it had not existed before it was 
named.
4. By saying this, I say it [is] different from that. If I could say this directly, 
I couldn’t doubt its existence. Moreover, I would regard its second existence 
as the first and the only. But now I see a minor error: I didn’t say this, but 
this in contrast to that. I reverted the error to the beginning. I noticed some 
duplication and in recollecting how I said this by saying something I supposed 
that I had noticed it then.
5. By saying this in contrast to that, I simultaneously said that. I said that before 
actually saying that, simply by referring to this. Now I say that before that 
and here a number of suppositions follow because even the first that was a 
supposition. These suppositions emerge at the first distinction, or division. 
When there is a series of suppositions, I can see nothing determinate and clear 
and remain in doubt.
6. I said this and that, and by saying this and that, I said one thing; one thing 
because it is no greater than this or than anything, thus, the doubt remains. 
If I join this and that, I say one and the other, I find some certainty.
7. I named something and I made a minor error in doing so. Then I observe 
it. I observe it twice: first, I observed a minor error when I made it. Some 
observation was a minor error. Later, I observe it again, this second observation 
is the second error. Thus, I observed some duplication here.
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8. Comprehension is recollection of some certainty of a moment. I recollect now 
some certainty of a moment, I had it before. At that time I gave a name to 
something, I recollected then something that had not existed before naming. 
Thus, in recollection there is also some duplication.
9. If there were only one error, who would notice it? By naming something I made 
a minor error, but noticed it later, by observing it and by recollecting it. This is 
the second error.
10. Something exists and needs affirmation. Naming something will be its 
affirmation; it will be [an affirmation] without reasoning, if I haven’t noticed the 
error; and it will be [an affirmation] with reasoning when I notice it. Thus, here, 
too, some duplication exists.
11. If there is affirmation without reasoning, then might there be an equilibrium 
without error, too? – If there exists something that does not need affirmation, 
then there truly exists equilibrium without error. But any affirmation is some 
duplication and some error. Thus, every equilibrium is equilibrium with 
a minor error. But to see that it is complete equilibrium, no affirmation is 
needed.
12. Some wearisome waiting, impatience, boredom accompany observation of 
time. This is the feeling of reality. It is tiresome and gives no pleasure. The 
other feeling of reality is in the great moment, and it does not make us weary.
13. You can stop the flow of time for a moment. You can see the beginning of a 
moment, but it can’t be retained, its ending will be lost. The beginning of a 
moment is the beginning of some reality. This is the third feeling of reality.
14. You have named something this. You have noticed some certainty and said 
this or that. Some sign – a turn of the head, an observation or a word – has 
by chance acquired certainty; it became this or that. In some interval, in the 
great moment, you have named something this. Now, just now, you have 
uttered some word, perhaps, some word of no specific meaning, and thereby 
something got affirmation. This is the fourth feeling of reality.
15. In order to find some certainty, it is necessary to join one with the other. 
But for doing so there needs to be something irrelative. I have found the 
irrelative: some accidental token of time, the naming in the great moment, the 
beginning and the sign, which possibly has no specific meaning. These are 
the tokens of a minor error in some equilibrium: something that had not existed 
before naming was named because it needed affirmation (Druskin, 1998c, 
pp. 805–807; my translation from Russian—A. M.)
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